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Euree SONG (éd.), Demiurge: The World-Maker in the Platonic Tradition, Special 
Issue of Horizons: Seoul Journal of Humanities, Vol. 3, no. 1-2, Seoul, Seoul 
National University Press, 2012. 
In just the last decade, many conference proceedings have been published on 
Plato’s Timaeus and its influence on the history of philosophy1. The present vo-
lume, which is the result of a symposium held at Seoul National University in 
September 2011, testifies to the enduring and widespread interest the Platonic dia-
logue is able to elicit. The nine studies here collected by Euree Song center on the 
figure of the demiurge as maker of the world and they all deal with authors who, 
while having different religious and philosophical beliefs, are either Platonists or 
indebted to the Platonic tradition. Apart from a chapter on Plato, the book con-
tains three chapters on Middle Platonic thinkers, two on Neoplatonism, and the 
last three on Medieval, Renaissance, and early Islamic philosophers, respectively. 
As may be expected, the topics under scrutiny include: the notion of demiurgy as a 
description of divine causal agency; the opposition between a metaphorical under-
standing of the demiurge, favoured by the majority of pagan thinkers, and the 
Judeo-Christian and Islamic conception of God as a principle endowed with 
personality who sets off a deliberate creative process; the divergent views on the 
nature of the demiurgic god’s activity which follow from conceiving of matter as 
either created or uncreated; and the question as to whether the demiurge is to be 
identified with the highest deity or with lower levels of reality. 
In the first paper (‘Who Is the Demiurge in Plato’s Timaeus?’, p. 3-18) 
Dominic O’Meara argues that the audience of Timaeus’ speech would have easily 
identified the demiurge with Zeus, as the demiurge shares many familiar features 
with the Greek conception of Zeus. And yet there are significant divergences 
between the two, insofar as Timaeus’ emphasis on the demiurge’s goodness disso-
ciates him from the often immoral image of Zeus that emerges from the poets’ 
stories. In line with the educational project of Republic II, Plato offers in the 
Timaeus a reformed image of divinity, “morally and metaphysically perfect” 
(p. 14). Finally, O’Meara explains that Plato chooses the notion of demiurgy to 
describe divine causality, since this notion best represents the action of the 
reformed god, but it is a pity that the chapter ends rather abruptly and that such an 
interesting argument is not pursued in further detail. 
In the next paper (‘The Middle Platonist Demiurge and Stoic Cosmobiology’, 
p. 19-39) Carl S. O’Brien contends that the figure of the demiurge disappears from 
view with Plato’s successors, it survives in the Stoic concept of logos (although 
combined with influences derived from Aristotle’s biology), only to re-emerge in 
the Platonic camp in the first century CE. The author then considers the influence 
 
1. See, for instance, T. Leinkauf and C. Steel (eds.), Platons Timaios als Grundtext der 
Kosmologie in Spätantike, Mittelalter und Renaissance/Plato’s Timaeus and the Foundations 
of Cosmology in Late Antiquity, the Middle Ages and Renaissance, Leuven: Leuven Univer-
sity Press, 2005; R. D. Mohr and B. M. Sattler (eds.), One Book, The Whole Universe: Plato’s 
Timaeus Today, Las Vegas/Zurich/Athens: Parmenides Publishing, 2010; F. Celia and 






of the Stoic logos on Philo of Alexandria’s and Plutarch’s conceptions of the de-
miurge. Unfortunately, only three brief pages are devoted to these two thinkers. 
For a more accurate description of Philo’s account of the demiurge the reader must 
turn to the following chapter by David T. Runia (‘God the Creator as Demiurge in 
Philo of Alexandria’, p. 41-59). In his article, Runia first provides a clear overview 
of the main features of Philo’s interpretation of God as demiurge, focusing on his 
presentation of the biblical account of creation in De opificio mundi. Next he 
shows that Philo’s faithfulness to his Greek models and the dominant presence of 
the demiurgic metaphor in his exposition do not allow him to capture all the ele-
ments of the biblical text: the emphasis on God’s making overshadows God’s other 
activities, such as speaking and seeing, while the introduction of the concept of 
matter – vital  for the demiurgic image, but foreign to the biblical narrative – gets 
Philo into trouble because he is unable to think through its consequences in a 
monotheistic context. 
In the fourth essay (‘Plato’s World-Maker in Origen’s Contra Celsum’, p. 61-
80) Cinzia Arruzza successfully illustrates the similarities and dissimilarities bet-
ween Plato’s demiurge and Origen of Alexandria’s Creator. On the basis of an 
insightful analysis of the strategy adopted by Origen in his critique of Celsus’ Pla-
tonic theology, Arruzza concludes that Origen is ready to make use of all the 
elements of Plato’s Timaeus which are not incompatible with the Christian 
doctrine, but rejects the others. Thus, in contrast to Plato’s and Celsus’ demiurge, 
Origen’s God is directly responsible for all creation (including matter) and 
maintains a personal relationship with the human being, which guarantees all men 
the possibility of knowing God. 
The following paper by Euree Song (‘Plotinus on the World-Maker’, p. 81-
102) examines Plotinus’ metaphorical understanding of demiurgy, according to 
which the artisanal model of generation is replaced by a process of contemplative 
derivation in which the demiurge becomes an almost superfluous entity. The 
demiurge, however, makes his appearance throughout the Enneads: as scholars 
have recognized, Plotinus equates him with Intellect, but transfers many of his 
functions to the World Soul and to Nature1. Song’s original contribution consists 
in the claim that these three levels of reality are characterized by three different 
kinds of ‘demiurgic’ activities, which are theoria, praxis, and poiesis, respectively. 
Now, I would suggest that this view might be partial, if not misleading, because it 
does not do justice to the several passages where Plotinus uses, at the same time, 
theoria and poiesis to describe the causal activities of Intellect, Soul, and Nature, 
while praxis is confined to the description of an inferior form of practical activity, 
which is not self-contained, but directed outward and opposed to contemplation2. 
The systematic reconstruction of Plotinus’ complex doctrines is a difficult enter-
 
1. Cf. J. Opsomer, ‘A Craftsman and his Handmaiden. Demiurgy According to Plo-
tinus’, in T. Leinkauf and C. Steel (eds.), Platons Timaios, cit., p. 67-102, to which Song’s 
article is much indebted. 
2. A list and a discussion of the relevant texts can be found in the too often neglected 
study by R. Arnou, ΠΡΑΞΙΣ et ΘΕΩΡΙΑ, Étude de détail sur le vocabulaire et la pensée des 
Ennéades de Plotin, Paris: Alcan, 1921. 
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prise, all the more so if one takes into account that traditional philosophical terms 
are often used by Plotinus in an unconventional way, as is the case here. It seems 
that Song’s interpretation places too much weight upon a few particular passages, 
and one wishes she had turned her attention to other significant passages as well. 
Gregory Shaw’s essay (‘The Chora of the Timaues and Iamblichean Theurgy’, 
p. 103-129) seeks to investigate the role played by the chora in the theurgist’s iden-
tification with the demiurgic god according to Iamblichus. The theurgists, true 
incarnations of the demiurge, are able through their rituals to discover the chora 
that is innate in them, to become receptacles for the divine influx, and finally to 
establish their identity with the god. The tone of the essay is rather inspired, but 
the author might have used a little more caution in his opening attack on a purely 
rationalist reading of Plato and later Platonists. Nobody nowadays would deny the 
extensive presence in the Platonic tradition of what can be labelled as ‘irratio-
nalism’, and to suggest the contrary is something of a straw-man. 
The paper by Lenka Karfíková (‘The Christian World-Maker according to 
Augustine, John Eriugena, and Thierry of Chartres’, p. 131-172), by far the longest 
in the collection, is a study over the presence of three different sources – namely, 
Plato’s Timaeus, the double account of creation in Genesis, and the doctrine of the 
Trinity – in the reflections on the creator of the world in Augustine, Eriugena, and 
Thierry of Chartres. Karfíková shows that the Timaeus is virtually absent from 
Augustine’s description of creation, and the same holds for Eriugena. Moreover, in 
Eriugena’s doctrine (which is heavily indebted to Neoplatonic speculations), the 
account of Genesis also does not play a relevant role. The situation is quite dif-
ferent with Thierry, who, among these authors, “is the one who makes the most 
explicit attempt at linking the biblical account of creation with Plato’s Timaeus, 
making also the tightest connection between cosmogony and the teaching on the 
Trinity” (p. 162). 
Filip Karfík’s essay (‘Marsilio Ficino on the Maker of the Universe’, p. 173-
193) is a rewarding study of two rival doctrines of world-making that emerge 
throughout Ficino’s works. The one “constitutes a sort of compromise between 
Neoplatonic and Christian views” (p. 178); the other represents “its specifically 
Christian variant” (p. 173). Both doctrines share the Christian belief that God is 
the immediate creator of unformed matter at all levels of the universe. The main 
difference, however, lies in the understanding of the divine mind or intellect: 
according to the ancient Platonists it is a demiurgic god inferior to the first deity, 
whereas for Christian Platonists it is God the Son, who is the same in substance 
with God the Father, though different in person. The latter view represents in 
Ficino’s eyes a more developed stage in the progressive revelation of truth, and 
allows the Christians to maintain that there is only one maker of the universe, who 
does not distribute some of his functions to lower agents. 
In the final article of the collection (‘The Early Ismāʿīlī Notion of the World-
Maker: The Intellect, the Soul, and the Lord of Creation and Revelation’, p. 195-
220) Shin Nomoto discusses the views of al-Nasafī, al-Rāzī, and al-Sijistānī, three 
Ismaili thinkers of the tenth century CE, strongly influenced by Neoplatonic phi-





the Intellect and with the Soul, but ascribe a proper demiurgic role only to the 
latter. 
The book is generally well edited, although it contains a few typos and other 
mistakes: see, e.g., the use of italics on p. 6: “the speech Timaeus gives in the Tima-
eus”; ‘Enn. IV 6 [8]’ instead of ‘Enn. IV 8 [6]’ on p. 95, n. 63; and ‘conditio’ for 
‘creatio’ on p. 136. 
All in all, the volume succeeds in providing a rather unified series of papers, 
each of which contributes to illustrate the different approaches that have been 
taken in the Platonic tradition to understand the figure of the world-maker. 
Alberto KOBEC 
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven 
 
Maddalena BONELLI (éd.), Physique et métaphysique chez Aristote, Paris, Librairie 
philosophique J. Vrin, 2012 (Bibliothèque d’histoire de la philosophie), 308 pages, 
ISBN 978-2-7116-2455-3 
Les études recueillies dans cet ouvrage collectif sont issues, dans leur grande 
majorité, de communications et de débats dans le cadre du séminaire du « Centre 
Léon Robin de Recherches sur la Pensée Antique » (UMR 8061, Université de 
Paris IV-Sorbonne, CNRS et ENS), consacré, pendant les années 2005-2007, à la 
Physique et la Métaphysique chez Aristote.  
Les contributions, rédigées ou traduites en français, sont soigneusement struc-
turées et caractérisées par une argumentation claire et approfondie. Elles portent 
presque toutes sur ces deux questions importantes : 1) quel est le contenu de la 
science ou discipline qui sera appelée plus tard « métaphysique » ? On pourrait 
ajouter : est-il possible d’établir un lien entre les sujets métaphysiques à première 
vue disparates abordés dans le livre d’Aristote qui porte ce nom ? 2) Quel est plus 
exactement le rapport entre physique et métaphysique chez Aristote ?  
Ainsi, après la préface de Maddalena Bonelli, les études sont présentées selon 
un ordre qui prend son point de départ dans l’Organon, en passant par la Méta-
physique (qui constitue l’objet de la plus grande partie d’entre elles) pour arriver à 
la Physique, au De anima et aux ouvrages biologiques, tandis que la dernière contri-
bution porte sur Alexandre d’Aphrodise. L’ouvrage se clôt par une bibliographie et 
trois index très utiles : sources, noms et notions.  
Au tout début, la contribution de Curzio Chiesa (p. 19-37), intitulée « Le 
problème de l’être dans le De interpretatione (chapitre 11) », qui offre une analyse 
détaillée du traitement aristotélicien de la question du passage de « Homère est un 
poète » à « Homère est » ; plus précisément, Aristote bloque ce genre d’inférence. 
Cela pose le problème de la différence entre « est » prédiqué « par accident » et 
« est » prédiqué « par soi ».  
Stephen Menn, dans l’article suivant, intitulé « La sagesse comme science des 
quatre causes ?» (p. 39-68), se concentre sur la définition de la σοφία au livre A de 
la Métaphysique dont la leçon serait plutôt négative, à savoir que les prédécesseurs 
d’Aristote ont jusqu’à maintenant échoué à découvrir la sagesse, surtout parce 
qu’ils ont échoué à découvrir la bonne ἀρχή et à y reconduire les choses comme à 
leur cause finale. Quant à la sagesse aristotélicienne, le livre A ne nous donne au-
cune raison de croire qu’elle sera une science de l’ensemble des quatre causes. En 
